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ABSTRACT
Measuring the Effectiveness of Generic Malware Models
by Naman Bagga
Malware detection based on machine learning techniques is often treated as a
problem specific to a particular malware family. In such cases, detection involves
training and testing models for each malware family. This approach can generally
achieve high accuracy, but it requires many classification steps, resulting in a slow,
inefficient, and impractical process. In contrast, classifying samples as malware or be-
nign based on a single model would be far more efficient. However, such an approach is
extremely challenging—extracting common features from a variety of malware fam-
ilies might result in a model that is too generic to be useful. In this research, we
perform controlled experiments to determine the tradeoff between accuracy and the
number of malware families modeled.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Malware is short for "malicious software" and is defined as software that is in-
tended to damage computers and computer systems without the knowledge of the
owner [1]. According to Symantec [2], more than 357 million new variants of malware
were found in 2016. Detecting all these new viruses is clearly an important research
topic
The complexity of malware is growing rapidly making malware detection a crit-
ical issue. Various malware detection techniques like signature-based detection and
heuristic detection have been developed over time to combat this issue. Signature-
based detection is the primary method used by commercial anti-virus products to
detect malware. This method involves storing signatures for all the different known
malware samples and comparing them to the file being scanned.
Signature-based detection is effective in general but fails to detect metamorphic
malware as such malware can modify their signature. Machine learning techniques
like hidden Markov models (HMM) [3], support vector machines (SVM), 𝑘-Nearest
Neighbors (𝑘-NN), decision trees and random forests [4] are used for effectively detect-
ing metamorphic malware. These models are usually trained using static file features
like opcode sequence and byte 𝑛-grams.
Previous research [5, 6, 7, 8] has shown that 𝑛-grams can be used for malware
detection with very high accuracy. However, a recent research study [9] on 𝑛-grams
rejects this claim and argues that 𝑛-grams promote over-fitting and the resulting
models only detect whether a file is a windows executable. This research used a large
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dataset consisting of all kinds of malware to build a single classifier. This approach
is questionable since malware detection is usually considered a problem specific to a
particular kind of malware and not just any general malware. The claim about the
ineffectiveness of 𝑛-grams needs to be investigated further by experimentation. The
feasibility of the idea of building a generic malware classifier to detect any malware
also needs to be studied.
In this research, we perform experiments using different machine learning tech-
niques like SVM, 𝑘-NN, random forests and statistical techniques like chi-squared test.
We also explore the effectiveness of two different features: opcodes and 𝑛-grams. We
aim to determine the tradeoff between accuracy and the number of malware types
modeled by conducting a set of experiments on individual malware families and the
same set of experiments on a combination of various malware families.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we discuss
relevant background information, related work and the motivation for conducting
this research. Chapter 3 discusses the machine learning techniques used — SVM,
𝜒2 test, 𝑘-NN and random forests. We discuss these techniques briefly along with
experimental setup and datasets used. The experiments and results are described in
Chapter 4. The paper concludes in Chapter 5 where we also discuss possible future
work related based on this research.
2
CHAPTER 2
Background
2.1 Malware Classification
Malware can be broadly classified into three types based on concealment strategy:
no concealment, encrypted, and metamorphic [10].
∙ No concealment malwares are the ones that do not use any techniques to
hide their code or alter the statistical properties of the files. Such malware can
easily be detected by simple techniques like signature-based detection.
∙ Encrypted malwares encrypt certain parts of the file that contain the mali-
cious code. These can be detected by executing them in a sandbox, since on
execution, the malware decrypts the encrypted part.
∙ Metamorphic malwares are the ones that carry a morphing engine within
their body that can modify their structure. These are the ones that are the
most difficult to detect as they can easily evade signature based detection.
Metamorphic malwares have been around since the late 1990’s. These were devel-
oped to defeat common malware detection techniques like signature-based detection.
Previous work has shown that machine learning techniques like HMM are an efficient
way to detect such malware. These techniques have been tested using both static
features like 𝑛-grams and dynamic features like API calls [11]. This is because meta-
morphic malware engines rely on code transposition and obfuscation to modify their
signature; however, the behavior of the virus and the sequence of API calls it uses is
the same.
3
2.2 Related Work
In this section, we talk about some of the previous work that has been done in
this area based on which we chose the techniques and features for our experiments.
Wong and Stamp [12] show that opcodes are effective features when used with
hidden Markov models. They trained models for three common metamorphic mal-
ware families and were able to successfully detect them. This malware detection
scheme outperformed most of the commercial anti-virus products. The results are
not surprising considering the fact that most commercial products rely on signature
based detection methods. This makes a strong case for opcodes since they are directly
related to the functionality of the program.
Singh et al. [13] applied three different techniques to obtain three scores: HMM
score, simple substitution distance score and opcode graph score. These three scores
were combined using a SVM classifier to build a stronger and more robust classi-
fier. This research demonstrates the use of SVM for combining scores from different
classifiers. Support vector machines work well when the data has a large number of
features as the technique projects data into a higher dimension. The approach used
here is scalable since it would work even if additional scores or features are added.
These ideas can be further generalized to using SVMs on 𝑛-gram frequencies to clas-
sify malware. This can be done by selecting 𝑘 𝑛-grams and using their frequencies as
features for each file.
Annachhatre et al. [14] trained several HMM’s on compilers and malware gener-
ators and combined these with clustering to devise an effective malware classification
technique. This research demonstrated the use of HMM and clustering to effectively
classify previously unknown malware.
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Reddy and Pujari [5] use a feature selection method that ranks 𝑛-grams based on
frequency and entropy. Their experiments show that performing a class-wise feature
selection improves the efficiency of the models. This process involves extracting the
top 𝑘 𝑛-grams from the benign and malware set and using a union of the two sets as
the feature space. This process can be used as a benchmark for future work.
Raff et al. [9] performed experiments on 𝑛-grams using elastic-net regularized lo-
gistic regression on a dataset containing over 200, 000 malware samples. The results
obtained from these experiments were poor as the classifier had very low accuracy.
This data was obtained from an undisclosed industry partner making this study hard
to validate. Similar studies using publicly available datasets should be of great ad-
vantage.
One of the ways to compare the performance of generic malware detection to
specific malware detection is to perform a set of experiments on individual malware
families and then on the combinations of those families. Accuracy, precision, and
recall can be used as metrics to quantify the effectiveness of these models. This should
give a direct comparison of the generic and specific malware detection approaches.
5
CHAPTER 3
Implementation
In this chapter we first discuss the dataset used in this project and then cover
the methods used for conducting the experiments.
3.1 Dataset
The following eight malware families were part of the Malware dataset for this
project.
Gatak [15] is a Trojan that collects information about the infected PC and sends it
to a hacker. This Trojan hides itself as part of a key generator application or
an update for a legitimate application.
Kelihos [16] is a family of Trojans that send out spam emails with links to installers
of Kelihos malware. It is a botnet that communicates with remote servers to
send spam emails and capture sensitive information.
Lollipop [17] is an adware program that shows the user ads while browsing the web.
This adware can also redirect search engine results, monitor the user’s activity
and send information to a hacker.
Obfuscator.ACY [18] is a family of obfuscated viruses that hide their purpose
through obfuscation. The underlying malware could have just about any pur-
pose.
Ramnit [19] is a worm that spreads through infected removable drives. It is capable
of stealing sensitive information like bank credentials and can give a hacker
access and control of your PC.
Winwebsec [20] is a Trojan that pretends to be an antivirus product. It convinces
6
the user to pay for the fake product by displaying messages stating that the
computer has been infected.
Zbot [21] or Zeus is a Trojan horse that infects systems by downloading configuration
files or updates. It is a financial botnet that steals confidential information like
online credentials
Zeroaccess [22] is a Trojan horse that makes use of a rootkit to hide itself. ZeroAccess
creates a backdoor on compromised systems and is capable of downloading
additional malware
These malware samples were obtained from the Microsoft Malware Classification
Challenge [23] and the Malicia Project. Table 1 lists the number of samples used
from each malware family. Table A.10 lists all the 300 benign executables used from
System32 in the benign set. These were collected from a 32 bit system running a
fresh install of Windows XP.
Table 1: Malware Samples
Malware Family Number of Samples
Gatak 1013
Kelihos 2942
Lollipop 2478
Obfuscator.ACY 1228
Ramnit 1541
Winwebsec 5820
Zbot 2167
Zeroaccess 1306
In the following sections we will describe the techniques used to perform experi-
ments on these datasets.
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3.2 Support Vector Machines
The first set of experiments conducted used support vector machine (SVM) as
the machine learning technique and 𝑛-grams as the feature.
3.2.1 Support Vector Machines
SVM is a supervised learning algorithm that is used for binary classification.
SVM takes a set of labeled data as input and tries to find the ideal separating hy-
perplane between the two classes. Once the model is trained, any new data can be
classified based on the model.
Figure 1: SVM - Separating Hyperplane
There are four big ideas [24] behind SVMs-
∙ Separating Hyperplane — The training data is separated into two classes us-
ing a hyperplane. If the input data is 𝑁 dimensional, the hyperplane has a
8
dimensionality of 𝑁 − 1.
∙ Maximize the margin — The separating hyperplane is chosen such that the
margin between the two classes of data is maximized. This gives us the best
odds of classifying the new data correctly and prevents any bias in the classifier.
Figure 1 depicts the separating hyperplane for the given data.
∙ Work in a higher dimensional space — In SVMs, the data is projected to a
higher dimensional space to make it easier to find the separating hyperplane.
This is because working in a higher dimensional space gives extra dimension to
the hyperplane as well. This is unlike most machine learning techniques where
dimensionality reduction is favorable.
∙ Kernel trick — To transform data to a higher dimension, a kernel function is
used. Picking the correct kernel function is tricky. The most common ker-
nel functions used are - Polynomial learning machine, Gaussian Radial-basis
funciton (RBF), and Two-layer perceptron.
3.2.2 Implementation
The SVM based experiments used 𝑛-grams as features. Each file in the malware
dataset was read as a binary file and every sequence of 𝑛 bytes was used as a 𝑛-gram.
The frequencies of these 𝑛-grams are used as features. The 𝑛-gram frequencies for
each file (malware and benign samples) form our feature vectors. The SVM based
experiments were conducted with the help of the scikit-learn [25, 26] Python library.
SVM models are trained on a subset of the dataset and tested on the remainder.
More details about the experiments conducted will be discussed in Section 4.2.1.
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3.3 Chi-squared test
Chi-squared test [27] of goodness is a popular statistical technique that can be
applied to categorical data to check if the observed frequency distribution differs from
the theoretical frequency distribution. This is one of the oldest statistical techniques
discovered by Pearson [28] in 1900.
Mathematically, the 𝜒2 statistic is essentially a normalized sum of square devi-
ation between the expected and the actual frequency distributions. It is computed
as
𝜒2 =
𝑛∑︁
𝑖=1
(𝑂𝑖 − 𝐸𝑖)2
𝐸𝑖
where
𝜒2 = Cumulative chi-squared statistic
𝑛 = number of dimensions or features
𝑂𝑖 = observed value of the 𝑖th feature
𝐸𝑖 = expected value of the 𝑖th feature
The 𝜒2 statistic was implemented in python to perform a set of experiments
on the 𝑛-gram distribution in the files. More details about the experiments will be
discussed in Section 4.3.1
3.4 𝑘-Nearest Neighbors
The 𝑘-Nearest Neighbor (𝑘-NN) algorithm is the simplest machine learning al-
gorithm possible [24]. 𝑘-NN is a supervised learning algorithm and requires labelled
training data. 𝑘-NN classifies a point 𝑥 based on the 𝑘 points in the training set
that are nearest to it. The advantage of using 𝑘-NN is that it involves no training as
10
labeled training data is all that the algorithm needs.
Several variations of 𝑘-NN are possible. One possibility is to weigh the nearest
neighbors based on their distance from the point. This is a good idea since one
point very near to the point can get more weight than two points a little far from it.
Another possible approach is to weigh the nearest neighbors based on their relative
frequency in the training set. This is useful when there is an imbalance in the match
and no-match set.
In this research, 𝑘-NN was implemented using python to build classifiers based
on 𝑛-gram frequencies as features. More details about these experiments and their
results will be discussed in Section 4.4.1
3.5 Random Forests
Random forests are a generalization of decision trees [24]. Random forests use
bagging on the observations as well as the features to construct multiple decision
trees. A random subset of the observations and a random subset of the features is
picked to construct multiple decision trees. For classification, the outputs of all these
decision trees are combined using some technique like a majority vote to get a single
classification.
The key advantage of random forests is that each decision tree uses a random
subset of observations and features making them highly immune to overfitting. The
obvious drawback is that we lose the simplicity of a single decision tree.
Random forests and 𝑘-NN classifiers are somewhat similar in the sense that both
of them rely on neighborhood based classification. However, in the context of random
forests, neighborhood refers to the collection of decision trees that it comprises of.
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In this research, we used scikit learn’s ensemble library [25] for python to imple-
ment random forests. 𝑛-gram frequences were used as features for these experiment
which will be described in more detail in Section 4.5.1.
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CHAPTER 4
Experiments and Results
This chapter discusses the experiments performed using different techniques and
explains the results. The techniques used are — SVM, 𝜒2 test, 𝑘-NN, and random
forests. We discuss the experimental design and metrics used to measure success as
well.
4.1 Experimental Design
Each of the experiments performed used 𝑛-gram frequencies as the features. Mal-
ware samples listed in Table 1 were used as the malware set and benign dataset listed
in Table A.10 was used as the benign set. Two set of experiments were conducted us-
ing each technique. The first set of experiments was conducted using all the available
malware samples of each family. The second set of experiments used a more balanced
dataset as only 1000 samples from each of the eight malware families were used for
these experiments.
For the purpose of these experiments we select 𝑛 = 2 i.e. we use 2-byte 𝑛-grams
or bigrams as features. The total number of possible bigrams is 232 or 65536. Using
these many features would be very time consuming and ineffective. Hence, a feature
selection mechanism needs to be implemented to perform these experiments. The
feature selection approach used here is similar to the one used by Reddy and Pujari
in [5]. The 10 most frequent bigrams present in the malware set are chosen along
with the 10 most frequent bigrams present in the benign set. A union of these two
sets is used as the feature set for these experiments. Figure 2 describes the feature
selection process flow.
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Figure 2: Bigram Feature Selection Process
To validate the results obtained from bigrams, experiments were also conducted
using 𝑛 = 3 and 𝑛 = 4 i.e. using 3-grams and 4-grams as features. Five-fold cross
validation was used for each of the experiments performed. This implies the dataset
was then divided into five parts each of which served as the test set once. When these
malware families were combined, special care was taken to ensure that each of these
five folds had a similar distribution of samples from each family.
Most of the machine learning techniques used in this research are classification
techniques as they return a classification of the tested files as the output. To measure
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the effectiveness of the models, balanced accuracy was computed using the equation
Balanced Accuracy =
1
2
(︂
TP
TP+ FN
+
TN
TN+ FP
)︂
Here, the symbols TP, TN, FP, FN are defined as:
∙ True Positive (TP) — Number of malware samples that are correctly classified
as malware
∙ True Negative (TN) — Number of benign samples that are correctly classified
as benign
∙ False Positive (FP) — Number of benign samples that are misclassified as mal-
ware
∙ False Negative (FN) — Number of malware samples that are misclassified as
benign.
The rationale behind using balanced accuracy is to deal with the imbalance in
the number of samples in the malware and benign sets. The imbalance is unavoidable
since the size of the malware dataset varies depending on the number of malware
families combined. Measuring the balanced accuracy ensures that the accuracy is
penalized if the number of false positives is large. A low false positive rate is extremely
important for malware detection since users lose confidence if a benign file that the
user is sure about is misclassified as malware.
4.2 SVM
In this section we discuss the experiments and results for the SVM and 𝑛-gram
based approach.
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4.2.1 Experiments
For the SVM based experiments, we first select the 𝑛-grams to use using the
technique mentioned in Section 4.1. Once we have the features i.e. the 𝑛-grams
to be used, the frequency for each of the 𝑛-grams is computed for each file. These
frequencies are normalized as a percentage of the total 𝑛-grams in each file to make
this number independent of file size. The matrix of these scaled frequencies forms the
feature vectors.
Malware samples listed in Table 1 were used as the malware set and benign
dataset listed in Table A.10 was used as the benign set. An SVM was trained on
these datasets using a radial basis function (RBF) kernel and soft margin (C) = 1.
These experiments were first conducted for all eight malware families. After this,
these families were combined in all possible combinations of 2, 3, 4 . . . 8 and these
experiments were repeated on the resultant datasets.
4.2.2 Results
The accuracies for experiments conducted on individual malware families are
listed in Table 2. Six of the eight malware families were classified with a very high
accuracy. The other two families — Lollipop and Ramnit are classified with a lower
accuracy. We also observed that results for both sets of experiments — using all
samples and 1000 samples are similar. This is as expected because 1000 samples
can be considered large enough to be representative of the entire set of a particular
family. Since most of the malware families score pretty well individually, it would
be interesting to look at all possible combinations of them to see how the generic
malware models behave.
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Table 2: SVM - Accuracies for individual families
Malware Family Balanced AccuracyAll Samples 1000 samples
Gatak 0.9630 0.9803
Kelihos 0.9983 0.9958
Lollipop 0.8409 0.8757
Obfuscator 0.9199 0.9195
Ramnit 0.8402 0.8619
Winwebsec 0.9712 0.9705
Zbot 0.9614 0.9627
Zeroaccess 0.9793 0.9808
Table 3 lists the average results of the experiments conducted on all possible
combinations of the eight malware families. Here “Combine 𝑘” refers to the average
accuracy of all experiments where 𝑘 malware families were combined. Refer to Table 9
for a complete list of accuracies.
Table 3: SVM - Average accuracy for malware models
Malware Families Average Balanced AccuracyAll Samples 1000 samples
Individual 0.9342 0.9434
Combine 2 0.8806 0.9010
Combine 3 0.8402 0.8605
Combine 4 0.8081 0.8310
Combine 5 0.7827 0.8077
Combine 6 0.7603 0.7890
Combine 7 0.7384 0.7738
Combine 8 0.7265 0.7678
The average accuracy is plotted against the generalization of the malware dataset
in Figure 3. Looking at the plot, we see a significant drop in accuracy with the increase
in generalization of datasets. When models are trained on individual malware families,
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the balanced accuracy is about 93% which drops to about 73% for the generic model
trained on all the eight families. This is intuitive since as the models become more
and more generic, they tend to learn very little about the data. As a result, we get
models that have very little margin between the two classes.
Figure 3: SVM Results - Average accuracy for generic models
To validate these results, the bigrams were examined to see if they followed any
pattern. Table 4 lists all the 𝑛-grams used by the most generic model which was
trained on the combination of all malware families. About half of the bigrams consist
of non-printable characters. Among the remaining bigrams, a fraction of them consist
of alphabets indicating that the bigrams here do not have any commonly occuring
strings in them.
0x0000 is a common bigram as it represents null which is common in large
executable files. Another common noticeable bigram in the list is 0xFFFF which has
all bits set. A lot of the other common bigrams that were used have one byte as 0x00
showing that null bytes are pretty common in the files.
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Table 4: Most frequent bi-grams
0000 FFFF 0100 0101
0303 4200 00FF 4000
008B 0200 4100 0001
2000 0020 CCCC 6500
0065 0074 7400 FF75
These experiments were also repeated for 3-grams and 4-grams with similar re-
sults. Refer to Appendix B for results of those experiments.
4.3 Chi-squared test
In this section we discuss the experiments and results for the 𝜒2 statistic based
approach.
4.3.1 Experiments
For the experiments using 𝜒2 statistics for 𝑛-grams, the malware samples listed
in Table 1 were used along with the benign samples listed in Table A.10. Like the
previous 𝑛-gram experiments, we initially used 𝑛 = 2 for these experiments. The
experiments were repeated for 𝑛 = 3 and 𝑛 = 4 as well. The feature selection method
was the same as depicted in Figure 2.
Once the features have been selected, for each malware sample in the training
set, we count the number of bigrams of each type and add them. These cumulative
frequencies are then normalized as a percentage of the total 𝑛-grams to get the ex-
pected distribution of 𝑛-grams in our training data. This expected distribution forms
our model to score against.
In the testing phase, 𝜒2 statistic was computed for each malware and benign
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sample in the test set. These 𝜒2 values are used as scores for the respective samples.
ROC curves were plotted using these scores to evaluate the effectiveness of these clas-
sifiers. These experiments were performed on all combinations of 1,2,3 . . . 8 malware
families.
4.3.2 Results
First we look at how well the scores performed when trying to classify individual
malware families. Table 5 lists the AUC values for each of the eight malware families.
Table 5: 𝜒2 test - AUC ROC for individual families
Malware Family AUC ROCAll Samples 1000 samples
Gatak 0.8784 0.9921
Kelihos 0.9943 0.9930
Lollipop 0.6541 0.6876
Obfuscator 0.8750 0.8712
Ramnit 0.8772 0.8748
Winwebsec 0.9450 0.9384
Zbot 0.8709 0.8646
Zeroaccess 0.9502 0.9472
Most of the families could be detected successfully using the 𝜒2 scores with the
exception of Lollipop which gave an AUC of 0.65. Figure 4 depicts the ROC curve
for Lollipop. This observation is similar to the SVM results where Lollipop had a
lower balanced accuracy than rest of the families.
Most of the other malware families could be detected easily. Specifically, Kelihos
was the easiest to detect (refer to ROC curve in Figure 5). The AUC for Kelihos is
0.99 which implies that 𝜒2 scores could distinguish the family from benign files very
accurately.
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Figure 4: 𝜒2 ROC Curve - Lollipop
Figure 5: 𝜒2 ROC Curve - Kelihos
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Now we analyze the results of the experiments that modeled more than one family
at a time. The average AUC is plotted against the number of families combined in
Figure 6. We can see a constant drop in AUC with increase in the number of families
combined however the magnitude of this drop is smaller than what was observed for
SVM. Even the most generic malware model yields an AUC of 0.80 which is pretty
decent considering the model was trained on all eight families. Figure 6 also shows a
little deviation between the results for the two sets of experiments. The experiments
conducted using only 1000 samples of each malware family show a sharper drop in
AUC which becomes constant after that. This is probably because the 1000 samples
chosen randomly from each family might be slightly different statistically.
Figure 6: 𝜒2 Results - Average AUC for generic models
The results for the experiments conducted using 3-grams and 4-grams were sim-
ilar to these results. These results can be found in Appendix B.
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4.4 𝑘 Nearest Neighbors
In this section we discuss the experiments and results for the 𝑘-NN based ap-
proach.
4.4.1 Experiments
For the experiments using 𝑘-NN, malware samples listed in Table 1 are used
along with benign samples from Table A.10. Like previous experiments, we used
𝑛 = 2 initially and the feature selection method used was the same as depicted in
Figure 2. These experiments were repeated for 𝑛 = 3 and 𝑛 = 4 as well.
After the 𝑛-grams are selected, we compute their frequencies and normalize them
as a percentage of the total 𝑛-grams int the sample. Since 𝑘-NN does not require
training, these labeled points from the training set form the model.
The value of 𝑘 was picked by performing some experiments on the family Gatak.
𝑘 was varied from 2 to 10 and the balanced accuracy was computed for all these cases.
Figure 7 depicts the results of these experiments.
Figure 7: 𝑘-NN Results - Varying values of 𝑘
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Based on experimental results, we pick 𝑘 = 5 since it gives us the highest balanced
accuracy. Also, the value 5 is neither too small nor too large to cause misclassification.
The neighbors are weighted based on distance which is an intuitive thing to do
𝑛-gram frequencies were computed for each malware and benign sample in the
test set and the resultant vectors are fed into the 𝑘-NN classifier. Five-fold cross
validation was used for these experiments.
4.4.2 Results
First we look at the accuracies for individual families. Table 6 summarizes the
results for those experiments. Using 𝑘-NN all families score a very high balanced
accuracy except Ramnit which is classified with an accuracy of about 86%. The
results for the two sets of experiments are similar.
Table 6: 𝑘-NN - Accuracy for individual families
Malware Family Balanced AccuracyAll Samples 1000 samples
Gatak 0.9514 1.0000
Kelihos 0.9765 0.9852
Lollipop 0.9334 0.9438
Obfuscator 0.9211 0.9267
Ramnit 0.8632 0.8752
Winwebsec 0.9481 0.9487
Zbot 0.9525 0.9600
Zeroaccess 0.9799 0.9827
Figure 8 depicts the variation in average accuracy with increasing generalization
of the models. The average accuracy drops consistently when the number of families
combined are increased. The magnitude of this drop in accuracy is smaller than
what is observed for SVM and 𝜒2 test. The most generic model that combines all
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eight families still has a balanced accuracy of 86%. The drop in accuracy however is
considerably large for all practical purposes.
The results for experiments conducted using 3-grams and 4-grams as features
were similar. Refer to Appendix B for the results of those experiments.
Figure 8: 𝑘-NN Results - Average accuracy for generic models
4.5 Random Forests
In this section we discuss the experiments and results for the random forest based
approach.
4.5.1 Experiments
For the experiments using random forests, malware samples listed in Table 1
are used along with benign samples from Table A.10. Like previous experiments, we
conducted experiments for 𝑛 = 2, 𝑛 = 3 and 𝑛 = 4. The feature selection method
used was the same as depicted in Figure 2.
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After the 𝑛-grams are selected, we compute their frequencies and normalize them
as a percentage of the total 𝑛-grams in the sample. These are then used to train a
random forest classifier. For these experiments we pick the number of decision trees
in the forest to be 10. The criterion to measure the quality of the split of the decision
trees is entropy or information gain.
𝑛-gram frequencies were computed for each malware and benign sample in the
test set and the resultant vectors are fed into the random forest classifier. Five-fold
cross validation was used for these experiments.
4.5.2 Results
First we look at the accuracies for individual families. Table 7 summarizes the
results for those experiments. Using random forests all families score higher than a
90% balanced accuracy.
Table 7: Random Forests - Accuracy for individual families
Malware Family Balanced AccuracyAll Samples 1000 samples
Gatak 0.9882 1.0000
Kelihos 0.9982 0.9962
Lollipop 0.9736 0.9750
Obfuscator 0.9505 0.9407
Ramnit 0.9049 0.9079
Winwebsec 0.9897 0.9882
Zbot 0.9894 0.9765
Zeroaccess 0.9887 0.9922
Figure 9 depicts the variation in average accuracy with increasing generalization
of the models. The average accuracy drops gradually with increasing number of
families being modeled. The magnitude of the drop is even smaller than what was
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observed for 𝑘-NN as the most generic model has an accuracy of 88%. The bagging
techniques used by random forests are probably the explanation for why the classifiers
are significantly stronger in this case. For instance if we think about the case where
we combine all eight families. We train 10 decision trees which form the random
forest based on 10 randomly selected subsets of the dataset and 10 random subsets
of 𝑛-grams. The dataset comprises of 8 families all of which are fairly balanced in
number. The random forest essentially turns this generic problem to a combination
of specific problems and hence the results are stronger than the other cases.
The results for experiments conducted using 3-grams and 4-grams as features
were similar. Refer to Appendix B for the results of those experiments.
Figure 9: Random Forests Results - Average accuracy for generic models
4.6 Summary of Results
Figure 10 depicts the variation in average accuracy with increasing generalization
of models for all the four techniques. The graphs shows that random forest is clearly
the strongest technique followed closely by 𝑘-NN. SVM is better than 𝜒2 test for
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detecting individual malware families but its accuracy drops steeply for more generic
models. All of these techniques show that detecting malware is more challenging
when the dataset is more generic.
Figure 10: Summary of Results - Average accuracy for generic models
Table 9 summarizes all the results in a heatmap. The combinations of malware
families are represented as a 8 bit mask where each family is assigned a bit. If the
bit is set, it signifies the presence of the malware family in the experiment. Table 8
provides an index to read the heatmap.
The heatmap is arranged in ascending order of number of families used. Look-
ing at the colors, we see towards the top, the accuracies are higher and they keep
decreasing as we move towards the bottom where the number of families is more.
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Table 8: Index for heatmap
Malware Family Bit Number
Gatak 0
Kelihos 1
Lollipop 2
Obfuscator 3
Ramnit 4
Winwebsec 5
Zbot 6
Zeroaccess 7
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Table 9: Heatmap of all results
Combination SVM Chisq 𝑘-NN RF SVM-2 Chisq-2 𝑘-NN-2 RF-2
00000001 0.9630 0.8784 0.9514 0.9882 0.9803 0.9921 1.0000 1.0000
00000010 0.9983 0.9943 0.9765 0.9982 0.9958 0.9930 0.9852 0.9962
00000100 0.8409 0.6541 0.9334 0.9736 0.8757 0.6876 0.9438 0.9750
00001000 0.9199 0.8750 0.9211 0.9505 0.9195 0.8712 0.9267 0.9407
00010000 0.8402 0.8772 0.8632 0.9049 0.8619 0.8748 0.8752 0.9079
00100000 0.9712 0.9450 0.9481 0.9897 0.9705 0.9384 0.9487 0.9882
01000000 0.9614 0.8709 0.9525 0.9894 0.9627 0.8646 0.9600 0.9765
10000000 0.9793 0.9502 0.9799 0.9887 0.9808 0.9472 0.9827 0.9922
00000011 0.9606 0.9395 0.9401 0.9744 0.9695 0.8774 0.9487 0.9789
00000101 0.8178 0.6528 0.9119 0.9709 0.8776 0.6233 0.9328 0.9735
00000110 0.8613 0.7267 0.9227 0.9725 0.8912 0.6339 0.9440 0.9723
00001001 0.8784 0.8506 0.9065 0.9352 0.8913 0.8423 0.9166 0.9263
00001010 0.9263 0.9242 0.9230 0.9606 0.9274 0.8404 0.9231 0.9517
00001100 0.7642 0.6192 0.8842 0.9303 0.8363 0.6349 0.9098 0.9382
00010001 0.8305 0.8521 0.8620 0.9091 0.8483 0.8268 0.8646 0.8936
00010010 0.8438 0.8967 0.8679 0.9098 0.8686 0.8274 0.8794 0.9046
00010100 0.7572 0.7004 0.8620 0.9045 0.8066 0.6414 0.8672 0.9091
00011000 0.7938 0.8306 0.8494 0.8899 0.8150 0.8286 0.8644 0.9080
00100001 0.9593 0.9470 0.9309 0.9698 0.9512 0.9006 0.9306 0.9635
00100010 0.9710 0.9340 0.9431 0.9782 0.9706 0.9394 0.9544 0.9749
00100100 0.8332 0.8388 0.9147 0.9612 0.8659 0.6973 0.9192 0.9648
00101000 0.9083 0.9381 0.9037 0.9407 0.9209 0.8648 0.9163 0.9363
00110000 0.8333 0.9251 0.8628 0.9050 0.8528 0.8627 0.8687 0.9063
01000001 0.9125 0.8355 0.9271 0.9572 0.9388 0.8385 0.9256 0.9659
01000010 0.9452 0.9049 0.9275 0.9676 0.9510 0.8520 0.9402 0.9816
01000100 0.8131 0.6134 0.9073 0.9491 0.8531 0.5994 0.9108 0.9530
01001000 0.8873 0.8435 0.9179 0.9400 0.8930 0.8233 0.9198 0.9483
01010000 0.8259 0.8103 0.8777 0.9050 0.8474 0.7868 0.8740 0.9067
01100000 0.9492 0.9235 0.9264 0.9563 0.9461 0.8798 0.9289 0.9580
10000001 0.9581 0.8748 0.9501 0.9812 0.9551 0.8522 0.9532 0.9828
10000010 0.9668 0.9377 0.9410 0.9824 0.9780 0.8875 0.9648 0.9904
10000100 0.8199 0.6533 0.9107 0.9574 0.8864 0.6687 0.9365 0.9768
10001000 0.8926 0.8635 0.9201 0.9545 0.9048 0.8409 0.9251 0.9442
10010000 0.8269 0.8504 0.8642 0.9070 0.8481 0.8323 0.8727 0.9001
10100000 0.9675 0.9274 0.9429 0.9679 0.9732 0.9113 0.9539 0.9756
11000000 0.9536 0.8561 0.9490 0.9716 0.9605 0.8640 0.9603 0.9758
00000111 0.8231 0.7196 0.9076 0.9512 0.8728 0.7101 0.9313 0.9683
00001011 0.8777 0.8984 0.9065 0.9374 0.8822 0.8275 0.9140 0.9288
00001101 0.7678 0.6600 0.8831 0.9188 0.8358 0.7012 0.9018 0.9295
00001110 0.8096 0.7187 0.8887 0.9375 0.8367 0.6501 0.9103 0.9475
00010011 0.8296 0.8781 0.8637 0.9027 0.8480 0.8268 0.8717 0.9122
00010101 0.7508 0.6987 0.8607 0.8971 0.7992 0.7186 0.8728 0.9068
00010110 0.7459 0.7301 0.8631 0.9064 0.8075 0.7105 0.8658 0.9030
00011001 0.7821 0.8305 0.8519 0.8967 0.8068 0.8281 0.8628 0.9033
00011010 0.8076 0.8626 0.8586 0.9049 0.8165 0.7739 0.8600 0.8922
00011100 0.7375 0.6861 0.8525 0.8946 0.7720 0.7045 0.8528 0.9027
00100011 0.9585 0.9262 0.9228 0.9598 0.9575 0.8749 0.9288 0.9668
00100101 0.8349 0.8370 0.9114 0.9563 0.8665 0.7069 0.9167 0.9520
00100110 0.8449 0.8259 0.9082 0.9581 0.8695 0.7079 0.9172 0.9562
00101001 0.8729 0.9197 0.8954 0.9359 0.8725 0.8606 0.9018 0.9247
00101010 0.9007 0.9136 0.9110 0.9362 0.9197 0.8431 0.9205 0.9302
00101100 0.8014 0.8295 0.8978 0.9345 0.8315 0.7055 0.8980 0.9325
00110001 0.8219 0.9158 0.8631 0.9136 0.8483 0.8682 0.8665 0.9135
00110010 0.8388 0.9038 0.8652 0.9037 0.8672 0.8323 0.8702 0.9057
00110100 0.7512 0.8122 0.8639 0.9101 0.8042 0.7066 0.8583 0.9040
00111000 0.8002 0.9003 0.8597 0.9000 0.8042 0.8424 0.8530 0.8902
01000011 0.9349 0.8843 0.9227 0.9563 0.9277 0.8350 0.9267 0.9723
01000101 0.7898 0.6476 0.8993 0.9461 0.8467 0.6735 0.9133 0.9470
01000110 0.8182 0.6987 0.9044 0.9393 0.8497 0.6814 0.9103 0.9568
01001001 0.8527 0.8416 0.9065 0.9240 0.8543 0.8222 0.9025 0.9205
01001010 0.8892 0.8670 0.9191 0.9429 0.8983 0.8088 0.9177 0.9417
01001100 0.7781 0.6407 0.8891 0.9309 0.8112 0.6538 0.8997 0.9308
01010001 0.8081 0.8176 0.8757 0.8985 0.8295 0.8049 0.8712 0.9117
01010010 0.8370 0.8490 0.8745 0.9074 0.8507 0.7865 0.8777 0.9005
01010100 0.7459 0.6694 0.8598 0.9124 0.7897 0.6831 0.8687 0.9102
01011000 0.7932 0.8129 0.8689 0.9071 0.8078 0.7984 0.8750 0.9017
01100001 0.9097 0.9106 0.9145 0.9516 0.9150 0.8670 0.9203 0.9512
01100010 0.9378 0.8927 0.9231 0.9548 0.9370 0.8517 0.9288 0.9587
01100100 0.8100 0.7987 0.9048 0.9412 0.8430 0.6872 0.9113 0.9515
01101000 0.8696 0.9053 0.9058 0.9377 0.8798 0.8599 0.9035 0.9352
01110000 0.8241 0.8949 0.8802 0.9055 0.8432 0.8330 0.8718 0.9032
10000011 0.9555 0.9070 0.9369 0.9713 0.9473 0.8136 0.9422 0.9725
10000101 0.8115 0.6927 0.9126 0.9591 0.8613 0.6810 0.9235 0.9720
10000110 0.8432 0.7356 0.9096 0.9430 0.8678 0.6475 0.9235 0.9570
10001001 0.8575 0.8304 0.9052 0.9293 0.8602 0.8045 0.9073 0.9265
10001010 0.9008 0.8822 0.9197 0.9509 0.9085 0.7937 0.9220 0.9438
10001100 0.7778 0.6880 0.8869 0.9319 0.8335 0.7018 0.9007 0.9297
10010001 0.8187 0.8244 0.8692 0.9201 0.8168 0.7790 0.8715 0.9102
10010010 0.8411 0.8901 0.8687 0.9004 0.8477 0.7731 0.8710 0.9060
10010100 0.7542 0.7218 0.8627 0.9076 0.8040 0.7586 0.8562 0.9093
10011000 0.7987 0.8457 0.8541 0.8966 0.7935 0.7921 0.8555 0.8817
10100001 0.9482 0.9123 0.9225 0.9646 0.9237 0.8515 0.9308 0.9673
10100010 0.9560 0.9118 0.9214 0.9580 0.9637 0.8629 0.9502 0.9702
10100100 0.8498 0.8238 0.9231 0.9497 0.8763 0.7213 0.9268 0.9572
10101000 0.8745 0.9016 0.9006 0.9340 0.8967 0.8604 0.9132 0.9322
10110000 0.8303 0.9091 0.8632 0.9015 0.8458 0.8201 0.8647 0.9120
11000001 0.9097 0.8304 0.9307 0.9639 0.9078 0.8120 0.9267 0.9660
11000010 0.9439 0.8664 0.9263 0.9561 0.9515 0.8085 0.9420 0.9793
11000100 0.8099 0.6616 0.9077 0.9378 0.8315 0.6373 0.9172 0.9548
11001000 0.8627 0.8403 0.9100 0.9380 0.8712 0.8269 0.9183 0.9378
11010000 0.8132 0.8059 0.8792 0.9069 0.8270 0.7782 0.8713 0.9207
11100000 0.9362 0.8916 0.9263 0.9631 0.9478 0.8555 0.9400 0.9655
00001111 0.7831 0.7230 0.8889 0.9345 0.8309 0.7505 0.9042 0.9284
00010111 0.7444 0.7344 0.8598 0.9061 0.7881 0.7646 0.8730 0.9109
00011011 0.8031 0.8490 0.8556 0.9031 0.8060 0.8059 0.8680 0.9037
00011101 0.7326 0.7034 0.8512 0.8890 0.7617 0.7416 0.8611 0.8917
00011110 0.7457 0.7357 0.8480 0.8952 0.7782 0.7478 0.8625 0.8953
00100111 0.8300 0.8197 0.9065 0.9430 0.8680 0.7405 0.9138 0.9510
00101011 0.8713 0.8979 0.8975 0.9297 0.8689 0.8412 0.8988 0.9216
00101101 0.7781 0.8227 0.8928 0.9310 0.8296 0.7464 0.8960 0.9263
00101110 0.7998 0.8159 0.8912 0.9293 0.8349 0.7163 0.8978 0.9358
00110011 0.8239 0.8880 0.8620 0.8988 0.8412 0.8473 0.8729 0.9073
00110101 0.7495 0.8186 0.8655 0.8969 0.7866 0.7569 0.8680 0.9098
00110110 0.7429 0.8046 0.8607 0.8972 0.8071 0.7322 0.8623 0.8982
00111001 0.7871 0.8911 0.8582 0.9102 0.8029 0.8469 0.8607 0.8832
00111010 0.8055 0.8866 0.8568 0.8774 0.8142 0.8068 0.8545 0.8985
00111100 0.7329 0.8136 0.8539 0.8938 0.7750 0.7452 0.8580 0.9009
01000111 0.7899 0.7054 0.9013 0.9279 0.8450 0.7371 0.9139 0.9573
01001011 0.8580 0.8620 0.9056 0.9312 0.8476 0.8181 0.9057 0.9321
01001101 0.7780 0.6636 0.8889 0.9208 0.8112 0.7157 0.8945 0.9322
01001110 0.7913 0.7022 0.8909 0.9230 0.8230 0.7119 0.9002 0.9331
01010011 0.8256 0.8331 0.8715 0.8980 0.8332 0.8472 0.8802 0.9025
01010101 0.7411 0.6857 0.8583 0.8960 0.7870 0.7211 0.8666 0.9028
01010110 0.7577 0.7103 0.8603 0.9002 0.7998 0.7334 0.8697 0.9056
01011001 0.7803 0.8104 0.8676 0.8895 0.7967 0.8006 0.8750 0.8846
01011010 0.7988 0.8208 0.8647 0.8969 0.8117 0.7757 0.8662 0.8923
01011100 0.7295 0.6875 0.8517 0.8885 0.7720 0.7102 0.8625 0.9012
01100011 0.9114 0.8885 0.9080 0.9532 0.9135 0.8458 0.9218 0.9522
01100101 0.8033 0.8145 0.9064 0.9381 0.8415 0.7328 0.9102 0.9453
01100110 0.8183 0.7975 0.9031 0.9431 0.8508 0.7009 0.9118 0.9449
01101001 0.8414 0.8954 0.8974 0.9363 0.8507 0.8449 0.8965 0.9317
01101010 0.8713 0.8791 0.9112 0.9346 0.8886 0.8287 0.9057 0.9328
01101100 0.7781 0.8036 0.8928 0.9280 0.8177 0.7175 0.8984 0.9291
01110001 0.8076 0.8877 0.8771 0.9071 0.8162 0.8379 0.8765 0.9027
01110010 0.8243 0.8701 0.8706 0.8972 0.8465 0.8026 0.8737 0.8991
01110100 0.7447 0.7952 0.8607 0.8805 0.7882 0.7268 0.8670 0.9001
01111000 0.7942 0.8775 0.8702 0.9024 0.8042 0.8234 0.8618 0.9012
10000111 0.8165 0.7344 0.9113 0.9547 0.8632 0.7262 0.9195 0.9607
10001011 0.8695 0.8715 0.9035 0.9423 0.8640 0.7949 0.9091 0.9294
10001101 0.7679 0.7086 0.8837 0.9291 0.8277 0.7365 0.8958 0.9162
10001110 0.8146 0.7405 0.8941 0.9342 0.8357 0.7468 0.9025 0.9215
10010011 0.8263 0.8693 0.8645 0.8946 0.8330 0.8121 0.8714 0.9174
10010101 0.7493 0.7293 0.8613 0.9088 0.7849 0.7510 0.8695 0.9065
10010110 0.7445 0.7449 0.8618 0.8882 0.8062 0.7775 0.8573 0.9038
10011001 0.7710 0.8092 0.8536 0.8955 0.7995 0.8338 0.8557 0.8900
10011010 0.8047 0.8580 0.8594 0.9014 0.8077 0.7601 0.8612 0.8871
10011100 0.7343 0.7253 0.8531 0.8967 0.7750 0.7523 0.8579 0.8917
10100011 0.9504 0.9122 0.9212 0.9515 0.9198 0.8244 0.9298 0.9605
10100101 0.8249 0.8292 0.9113 0.9515 0.8598 0.7176 0.9136 0.9471
10100110 0.8349 0.8159 0.9065 0.9481 0.8614 0.7249 0.9172 0.9510
10101001 0.8580 0.9094 0.8939 0.9431 0.8599 0.8140 0.8964 0.9270
10101010 0.8911 0.8998 0.9061 0.9346 0.8955 0.8129 0.9163 0.9317
10101100 0.7964 0.8222 0.8978 0.9294 0.8305 0.7445 0.9008 0.9248
10110001 0.8138 0.9060 0.8633 0.9001 0.8140 0.7934 0.8625 0.8978
10110010 0.8339 0.8882 0.8653 0.8972 0.8476 0.7896 0.8579 0.9079
10110100 0.7479 0.8133 0.8640 0.9003 0.7945 0.7724 0.8527 0.8972
10111000 0.7971 0.8867 0.8583 0.8955 0.7953 0.8093 0.8547 0.9024
11000011 0.9047 0.8584 0.9245 0.9598 0.9077 0.8013 0.9284 0.9653
11000101 0.8082 0.6804 0.9044 0.9496 0.8432 0.7191 0.9121 0.9427
11000110 0.8166 0.7123 0.9028 0.9380 0.8431 0.7183 0.9123 0.9555
11001001 0.8444 0.8310 0.9018 0.9243 0.8491 0.7965 0.9037 0.9247
11001010 0.8763 0.8209 0.9142 0.9478 0.8839 0.7740 0.9190 0.9495
11001100 0.7829 0.6840 0.8876 0.9192 0.8160 0.7081 0.9031 0.9308
11010001 0.8018 0.8297 0.8762 0.9093 0.8311 0.8230 0.8728 0.9020
11010010 0.8355 0.8375 0.8748 0.9079 0.8312 0.7628 0.8751 0.9095
11010100 0.7575 0.6965 0.8650 0.8913 0.7902 0.7304 0.8669 0.8977
11011000 0.7869 0.8268 0.8678 0.8982 0.7857 0.7711 0.8579 0.8991
11100001 0.8931 0.9007 0.9145 0.9480 0.8962 0.8250 0.9236 0.9525
11100010 0.9362 0.8930 0.9148 0.9547 0.9431 0.8247 0.9253 0.9568
11100100 0.8182 0.8071 0.9098 0.9365 0.8399 0.7248 0.9104 0.9544
11101000 0.8598 0.8969 0.9026 0.9379 0.8635 0.8338 0.9103 0.9300
11110000 0.8225 0.8814 0.8821 0.9003 0.8331 0.8001 0.8800 0.8914
00011111 0.7458 0.7422 0.8465 0.8835 0.7653 0.7728 0.8684 0.8872
00101111 0.7865 0.8149 0.8912 0.9263 0.8274 0.7778 0.8948 0.9287
00110111 0.7413 0.8034 0.8591 0.9023 0.7983 0.8039 0.8662 0.9172
00111011 0.7940 0.8675 0.8552 0.9024 0.8015 0.8136 0.8637 0.8957
00111101 0.7245 0.8206 0.8539 0.8890 0.7687 0.7700 0.8537 0.9019
00111110 0.7296 0.8052 0.8540 0.8677 0.7768 0.7741 0.8571 0.8845
01001111 0.7764 0.7128 0.8876 0.9263 0.8098 0.7518 0.8945 0.9207
01010111 0.7429 0.7244 0.8603 0.8990 0.7954 0.7549 0.8738 0.9098
01011011 0.7874 0.8184 0.8683 0.9002 0.7990 0.8310 0.8743 0.8923
01011101 0.7295 0.7024 0.8502 0.8885 0.7641 0.7322 0.8608 0.8854
01011110 0.7445 0.7193 0.8521 0.8806 0.7757 0.7397 0.8638 0.8920
01100111 0.7900 0.7964 0.8931 0.9314 0.8417 0.7689 0.9083 0.9357
01101011 0.8498 0.8694 0.8978 0.9296 0.8435 0.8254 0.8951 0.9210
01101101 0.7698 0.8123 0.8912 0.9213 0.8063 0.7571 0.8851 0.9223
01101110 0.7765 0.7893 0.8880 0.9197 0.8192 0.7203 0.8979 0.9268
01110011 0.8144 0.8594 0.8674 0.8939 0.8166 0.8122 0.8756 0.9025
01110101 0.7546 0.8031 0.8707 0.8839 0.7788 0.7613 0.8725 0.9066
01110110 0.7414 0.7902 0.8608 0.8808 0.7914 0.7581 0.8686 0.8925
01111001 0.7660 0.8775 0.8637 0.8973 0.7817 0.8307 0.8567 0.8837
01111010 0.7943 0.8595 0.8639 0.8941 0.8037 0.7958 0.8620 0.9021
01111100 0.7413 0.8054 0.8624 0.8755 0.7614 0.7421 0.8567 0.8888
10001111 0.7814 0.7420 0.8892 0.9262 0.8274 0.7610 0.8982 0.9235
10010111 0.7428 0.7502 0.8602 0.8900 0.7901 0.7725 0.8718 0.9070
10011011 0.7984 0.8388 0.8562 0.9034 0.8002 0.8516 0.8572 0.8836
10011101 0.7311 0.7370 0.8516 0.8849 0.7738 0.7464 0.8540 0.8968
10011110 0.7442 0.7520 0.8468 0.8920 0.7753 0.7657 0.8651 0.8824
10100111 0.8283 0.8129 0.9064 0.9364 0.8616 0.7399 0.9123 0.9522
10101011 0.8630 0.8893 0.8926 0.9297 0.8570 0.7960 0.8962 0.9282
10101101 0.7765 0.8193 0.8928 0.9164 0.8193 0.7571 0.8894 0.9114
10101110 0.8115 0.8082 0.8928 0.9180 0.8337 0.7446 0.9040 0.9267
10110011 0.8223 0.8745 0.8621 0.8991 0.8194 0.7903 0.8667 0.8949
10110101 0.7496 0.8188 0.8656 0.8973 0.7802 0.7696 0.8620 0.9118
10110110 0.7430 0.8045 0.8608 0.9008 0.7960 0.7898 0.8577 0.9016
10111001 0.7873 0.8857 0.8584 0.9005 0.7964 0.8449 0.8483 0.9018
10111010 0.8056 0.8741 0.8570 0.8908 0.8014 0.8167 0.8562 0.8873
10111100 0.7279 0.8107 0.8522 0.8988 0.7667 0.7689 0.8531 0.8889
11000111 0.8049 0.7222 0.9029 0.9332 0.8416 0.7493 0.9105 0.9408
11001011 0.8547 0.8478 0.9058 0.9263 0.8458 0.7683 0.9050 0.9204
11001101 0.7780 0.6941 0.8891 0.9346 0.8080 0.7306 0.8897 0.9255
11001110 0.7847 0.7245 0.8911 0.9128 0.8195 0.7547 0.8984 0.9222
11010011 0.8140 0.8290 0.8784 0.8935 0.8217 0.8443 0.8754 0.9057
11010101 0.7412 0.7137 0.8684 0.8882 0.7855 0.7299 0.8685 0.9047
11010110 0.7510 0.7253 0.8687 0.9020 0.7933 0.7507 0.8650 0.9033
11011001 0.7756 0.8231 0.8664 0.9011 0.7956 0.8140 0.8651 0.8906
11011010 0.7974 0.8227 0.8701 0.9003 0.8015 0.7773 0.8632 0.8921
11011100 0.7427 0.7095 0.8568 0.8869 0.7600 0.7397 0.8583 0.8778
11100011 0.9014 0.8792 0.9080 0.9316 0.8928 0.8021 0.9164 0.9469
11100101 0.8000 0.8132 0.9014 0.9465 0.8399 0.7505 0.9084 0.9326
11100110 0.8183 0.7942 0.9015 0.9315 0.8449 0.7138 0.9089 0.9374
11101001 0.8398 0.8902 0.8958 0.9347 0.8453 0.8215 0.8962 0.9299
11101010 0.8680 0.8681 0.9097 0.9281 0.8699 0.7785 0.9085 0.9333
11101100 0.7748 0.8034 0.8928 0.9229 0.8145 0.7615 0.8968 0.9316
11110001 0.7992 0.8821 0.8772 0.8954 0.8112 0.8404 0.8767 0.8993
11110010 0.8211 0.8607 0.8707 0.8940 0.8284 0.7695 0.8727 0.8912
11110100 0.7546 0.8034 0.8708 0.8920 0.7894 0.7524 0.8661 0.8933
11111000 0.7943 0.8720 0.8704 0.8943 0.7981 0.8248 0.8646 0.8987
00111111 0.7263 0.8044 0.8524 0.8959 0.7703 0.7981 0.8574 0.8912
01011111 0.7246 0.7313 0.8537 0.8873 0.7654 0.7641 0.8658 0.8997
01101111 0.7665 0.7999 0.8879 0.9230 0.8047 0.7881 0.8855 0.9161
01110111 0.7414 0.7902 0.8592 0.8858 0.7792 0.7922 0.8716 0.9027
01111011 0.7794 0.8513 0.8640 0.8824 0.7857 0.8543 0.8645 0.8958
01111101 0.7330 0.8061 0.8608 0.8875 0.7593 0.7625 0.8612 0.8909
01111110 0.7264 0.7921 0.8541 0.8877 0.7659 0.7694 0.8611 0.8776
10011111 0.7459 0.7564 0.8452 0.8823 0.7738 0.7715 0.8518 0.8797
10101111 0.7832 0.8088 0.8912 0.9148 0.8212 0.7879 0.8902 0.9306
10110111 0.7414 0.8043 0.8591 0.8726 0.7772 0.7967 0.8646 0.8938
10111011 0.7891 0.8586 0.8554 0.8990 0.8036 0.8230 0.8558 0.8928
10111101 0.7330 0.8286 0.8623 0.8808 0.7673 0.7868 0.8527 0.8882
10111110 0.7296 0.8059 0.8541 0.8827 0.7754 0.7882 0.8555 0.8926
11001111 0.7764 0.7268 0.8877 0.9231 0.8081 0.7610 0.8888 0.9294
11010111 0.7478 0.7312 0.8671 0.8887 0.7876 0.7601 0.8713 0.8993
11011011 0.7842 0.8148 0.8686 0.9007 0.7920 0.8359 0.8710 0.8895
11011101 0.7345 0.7374 0.8587 0.8787 0.7710 0.7508 0.8609 0.8979
11011110 0.7396 0.7318 0.8572 0.8773 0.7673 0.7584 0.8627 0.8947
11100111 0.8000 0.8082 0.9047 0.9349 0.8331 0.7801 0.9060 0.9312
11101011 0.8498 0.8625 0.8978 0.9280 0.8414 0.8031 0.8966 0.9158
11101101 0.7665 0.8116 0.8913 0.9280 0.8029 0.7587 0.8884 0.9143
11101110 0.7832 0.7974 0.8913 0.9130 0.8163 0.7862 0.8953 0.9205
11110011 0.8095 0.8534 0.8675 0.8942 0.8091 0.8654 0.8763 0.8972
11110101 0.7530 0.8046 0.8691 0.8924 0.7842 0.7740 0.8696 0.8944
11110110 0.7414 0.7914 0.8609 0.8943 0.7922 0.7770 0.8662 0.8971
11111001 0.7595 0.8740 0.8639 0.8957 0.7790 0.8329 0.8642 0.9155
11111010 0.7844 0.8521 0.8657 0.8993 0.8002 0.8051 0.8659 0.9026
11111100 0.7397 0.8066 0.8608 0.8857 0.7587 0.7627 0.8573 0.9026
01111111 0.7230 0.7922 0.8525 0.8825 0.7593 0.7869 0.8647 0.8965
10111111 0.7247 0.8054 0.8525 0.8877 0.7640 0.8082 0.8479 0.8881
11011111 0.7229 0.7426 0.8539 0.8806 0.7710 0.7742 0.8616 0.8701
11101111 0.7665 0.7995 0.8879 0.9163 0.8047 0.7802 0.8869 0.9159
11110111 0.7398 0.7917 0.8592 0.8862 0.7810 0.7955 0.8711 0.8931
11111011 0.7745 0.8461 0.8641 0.8960 0.7825 0.8532 0.8629 0.8932
11111101 0.7330 0.8078 0.8592 0.8824 0.7694 0.7707 0.8599 0.8898
11111110 0.7230 0.7936 0.8542 0.8910 0.7589 0.7821 0.8592 0.8965
11111111 0.7265 0.7986 0.8609 0.8927 0.7678 0.7892 0.8582 0.8883
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CHAPTER 5
Conclusions and Future Work
5.1 Conclusion
We used four different machine learning techniques — support vector machines
(SVM), 𝜒2 test, 𝑘-NN, and random forests using 𝑛-grams as features to evaluate the
effectiveness of generic malware models. Experiments were conducted on all possible
combinations of the seven malware families using all these techniques. We conducted
experiments with balanced datasets where each family had 1000 samples and with
imbalanced datasets where each family had different number of samples. We also
experimented with different values of 𝑛 i.e. we performed these experiments using
2-grams, 3-grams and 4-grams.
The SVM model performed well on individual malware families. However, the
effectiveness of the SVM fades quickly when the malware set is more generic. In the
most generic case, the SVM model could only manage a balanced accuracy of 73%.
𝜒2 was not as effective as SVM for the individual families but scaled better for the
more generic tests. 𝑘-NN and random forests were both good at classifying individual
families and their accuracy curves didn’t dip as much as other techniques.
To summarize, SVM, 𝜒2, 𝑘-NN and random forests all performed well for individ-
ual malware families. The accuracy for all of these techniques dropped significantly
when the models were more generic. Some of these techniques did better than others
in the more generic cases. The random forest specifically was the strongest classifier
with an accuracy of 88% for the most generic model.
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5.2 Future Work
In this research we’ve observed the degradation of efficiency of malware detection
techniques when the malware set is made more generic. We have also observed that
techniques like random forests are less prone to being affected by generalization.
Additional features like opcodes and techniques like hidden Markov Mod-
els (HMM) could be explored in future. Previous research [11] has shown that dy-
namic features like API calls are strong features when used with HMM. It should be
interesting to see similar experiments be conducted using API calls as features. An
analogous set of experiments could also be performed on opcodes to see how they fare
with generic models.
The random forest based classifier came closest to effectively detecting generic
malware. This can be attributed to the double bagging built into the algorithm. It
would be interesting to use bagging on the other techniques used in this research and
compare their performance.
In this research we used all kinds of malware families with different kinds of
behavior like Botnets, Trojans, Worms, Adware. A similar set of experiments with
malware families of similar kinds should give an interesting insight on whether the
behavior of malware affects their detection. It would also answer the question whether
combining similar malware families is better than combining random families.
One of the challenges faced during this research was finding labeled datasets.
There are a lot of malware datasets available but they contain all kinds of malware. It
would be useful to develop a technique to cluster these malware into families without
knowing anything about them. Such a mechanism would facilitate more of such
experiments at a larger scale.
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APPENDIX A
Benign dataset
Table A.10: Benign Dataset
alg dpnsvr lpr rdsaddin spiisupd
append dpvsetup lsass rdshost spnpinst
arp driverquery magnify recover spoolsv
asr_fmt drwatson makecab redir sprestrt
asr_ldm drwtsn32 mem regedt32 stimon
asr_pfu dumprep migpwd reg subst
at dvdplay mmc regini svchost
atmadm dvdupgrd mmcperf regsvr32 syncapp
attrib dwwin mnmsrvc regwiz sysedit
auditusr dxdiag mobsync relog syskey
autochk edlin mountvol replace sysocmgr
autoconv esentutl mplay32 reset systeminfo
autofmt eudcedit mpnotify rexec systray
autolfn eventcreate mqbkup RmActivate taskkill
blastcln eventtriggers mqsvc RmActivate_isv tasklist
bootcfg eventvwr mqtgsvc RmActivate_ssp taskman
bootok exe2bin mrinfo RmActivate_ssp_isv taskmgr
bootvrfy expand mrt route tcmsetup
BrowserChoice extrac32 mscdexnt routemon tcpsvcs
cacls fastopen msdtc rsh telnet
calc fc msfeedssync rsm tftp
charmap find msg rsmsink tlntadmn
chkdsk findstr mshearts rsmui tlntsess
chkntfs finger mshta rsnotify tlntsvr
cidaemon fixmapi msiexec rsopprov tourstart
cipher FlashPlayerApp mspaint rspndr tracerpt
cisvc fltMc msswchx rsvp tracert6
ckcnv FontReg mstinit runas tracert
cleanmgr fontview mstsc rundll32 tscon
cliconfg forcedos napstat runonce tsdiscon
clipbrd freecell netsetup rwinsta tskill
clipsrv fsquirt netsh savedump tsshutdn
cmd fsutil netstat scardsvr tswbprxy
cmdl32 ftp nlsfunc sc typeperf
cmmon32 gdi ntvdm schtasks tzchange
cmstp getmac nw16 sdbinst unlodctr
compact gpresult nwscript secedit upnpcont
comp gpupdate odbcad32 services ups
conime grpconv pentnt sessmgr user
control help perfmon sethc userinit
convert hostname ping6 setup wextract
cscript ie4uinit ping setupn wiaacmgr
csrss ieudinit pintool setupold winchat
ctfmon iexpress powercfg setver winfxdocobj
dcomcnfg imapi print sfc winhlp32
ddeshare ipconfig progman shadow winlogon
debug ipsec6 proquota share winmine
defrag ipv6 proxycfg shmgrate winmsd
dfrgfat ipxroute qappsrv shrpubw winspool
dfrgntfs krnl386 qfecheck shutdown winver
diantz label qprocess sigverif wksprt
diskpart lights qwinsta skeys wpabaln
diskperf lnkstub rasautou smbinst wpnpinst
dllhost locator rasdial smlogsvc write
dllhst3g lodctr rasphone smss wscntfy
dmadmin logagent rcimlby sndrec32 wscript
dmremote logman rcp sndvol32 wuauclt1
doskey logoff rdpclip sol wuauclt
dosx logonui rdpinit sort wupdmgr
dplaysvr lpq rdpshell spider xcopy
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APPENDIX B
Additional Results
B.1 Results for 3-grams
Results for 𝑛=3 are presented below
Table B.11: SVM Accuracy for individual families using 3-grams
Malware Family Balanced Accuracy
Gatak 0.9627
Kelihos 0.9832
Lollipop 0.8861
Obfuscator 0.8787
Ramnit 0.7568
Winwebsec 0.9678
Zbot 0.9470
Zeroaccess 0.9760
Figure B.11: SVM Results - Average accuracy for generic models using 3-grams
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Table B.12: 𝜒2 test - AUC ROC for individual families using 3-grams
Malware Family AUC ROC
Gatak 0.9696
Kelihos 0.9797
Lollipop 0.8306
Obfuscator 0.7899
Ramnit 0.8012
Winwebsec 0.9605
Zbot 0.8280
Zeroaccess 0.8504
Figure B.12: 𝜒2 Results - Average AUC for generic models using 3-grams
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Table B.13: 𝑘-NN Accuracy for individual families using 3-grams
Malware Family Balanced Accuracy
Gatak 0.9639
Kelihos 0.9765
Lollipop 0.9520
Obfuscator 0.8816
Ramnit 0.7919
Winwebsec 0.9598
Zbot 0.9411
Zeroaccess 0.9716
Figure B.13: 𝑘-NN Results - Average accuracy for generic models using 3-grams
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Table B.14: Random Forests Accuracy for individual families using 3-grams
Malware Family Balanced Accuracy
Gatak 0.9859
Kelihos 0.9913
Lollipop 0.9782
Obfuscator 0.9336
Ramnit 0.8653
Winwebsec 0.9863
Zbot 0.9568
Zeroaccess 0.9899
Figure B.14: Random Forests Results - Average accuracy for generic models using
3-grams
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B.2 Results for 4-grams
Results for 𝑛=4 are presented below
Table B.15: SVM Accuracy for individual families using 4-grams
Malware Family Balanced Accuracy
Gatak 0.9665
Kelihos 0.9891
Lollipop 0.8607
Obfuscator 0.8236
Ramnit 0.6568
Winwebsec 0.9376
Zbot 0.9247
Zeroaccess 0.9881
Figure B.15: SVM Results - Average accuracy for generic models using 4-grams
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Table B.16: 𝜒2 test - AUC ROC for individual families using 4-grams
Malware Family AUC ROC
Gatak 0.9155
Kelihos 0.9501
Lollipop 0.6068
Obfuscator 0.7283
Ramnit 0.7139
Winwebsec 0.8225
Zbot 0.8226
Zeroaccess 0.9179
Figure B.16: 𝜒2 Results - Average AUC for generic models using 4-grams
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Table B.17: 𝑘-NN Accuracy for individual families using 4-grams
Malware Family Balanced Accuracy
Gatak 0.9699
Kelihos 0.9898
Lollipop 0.8960
Obfuscator 0.8691
Ramnit 0.7446
Winwebsec 0.9497
Zbot 0.9473
Zeroaccess 0.9831
Figure B.17: 𝑘-NN Results - Average accuracy for generic models using 4-grams
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Table B.18: Random Forests Accuracy for individual families using 4-grams
Malware Family Balanced Accuracy
Gatak 0.9884
Kelihos 0.9975
Lollipop 0.9618
Obfuscator 0.9382
Ramnit 0.8875
Winwebsec 0.9864
Zbot 0.9718
Zeroaccess 0.9928
Figure B.18: Random Forests Results - Average accuracy for generic models using
4-grams
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